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This paper addresses the question if and how negotiated agreements between 
government and industry can improve the environmental performance of 
companies. In answering this question, as a representative of an environmental 
NGO,2 we want to illustrate four propositions:
• negotiated agreements in themselves are not more than a minor step towards 
sustainable production;
• negotiated agreements will only work if there is an effective regulatory 
framework with regard to performance standards, so that at a minimum level 
formal equality between companies is assured and free-riders can be dealt 
with;
• public access to information on the results o f agreements and the performance 
of individual companies is an essential requirement;
• though negotiated agreements offer both opportunities and threats, as with any 
change, the balance o f judgement depends on the credibility o f agreements. 
Credibility requires strong commitment of the parties to the targets o f an 
agreement and the willingness to take the necessary actions whenever troubles 
arise in the implementation process.
The scope of this paper is limited to negotiated environmental agreements 
between government and the secondary sector (i.e. industry), though agreements 
with other economic sectors are also known, as well as agreements in which no 
(national) public body participates (like neighbourhood agreements and self­
obligations of industry). The geographic scope is Europe, but most examples are 
from The Netherlands. In order to obtain the necessary depth, our subject is put 
into the context of a much more challenging issue: how can the environmental 
performance of European industry be improved substantially through policies of 
the European Union or its member states.
Section two identifies some trends in environmental thinking in industry and 
the challenges that lie ahead. Section three discusses negotiated agreements in the 
context of the possibilities for the improvement of European environmental 
policy as a whole. Section four elaborates on the 'rules of the game' for negotiated 
agreements, based in particular on the many Dutch experiences, but with an eye
2With regard to negotiated agreements, The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment 
critically follows their development and implementation and signals Parliament, Government, 
public bodies, industry and press when important issues arise. The Society does not participate 



























































































towards experiences in other member states. In section five, some often heard 
questions regarding negotiated agreements are answered, while section six draws 
conclusions about the value of negotiated agreements in EU environmental 
policy.
Environmental Thinking in Industry: Issues
This section addresses the issues in environmental thinking that have emerged in 
influential bodies of industry over the past few years. A focal point of industry 
thinking was the United Nations world environment conference in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992. Bodies of industry that have since become active in promoting voluntary 
agreements are the International Chamber of Commerce (see for example WICE 
(1994)), UNICE (European employers organisation), and many transnational 
companies and influential trade organisations like CEFIC (European chemical 
industry).
Public authorities in many industrialised countries are reconsidering their role 
and ambitions. In particular, co-operation between policymakers and industry has 
become a trendy issue. In EU environmental policy, a change of course was laid 
down in the Fifth Environmental Action Program of 1992, which emphasised the 
responsibilities of industry. In 1995, the European Commission actively started 
exploring the opportunities for negotiated (or voluntary) agreements. Many 
industrial countries within and outside the EU (like the United States, Japan and 
Korea) were already acquainted with these instrument in some form.
However, reaching sustainability in industrial production is seldom at the core 
of the debate on new instruments in environmental policy. Rather, central issues 
in the worldwide debate on co-operation between governments and industry in 
environmental matters are:
• increasing use o f voluntary or negotiated measures;
• more flexibility in policy implementation in combination with consistent 
policies and clear, long-term targets;
• attention to cost-effective policies and priority-setting, stimulating an 
integrated approach towards environmental problems.
These are the recurring issues in industry's policy papers, memoranda, etc. to 
governments, often implying the need for fewer regulations. This is in essence an 
economic and not an environmental agenda. A characteristic quote: “Voluntary 




























































































industry on the environment,” said former CEF1C president Daniel Janssen at a 
conference of Euro-Chlor in Brussels (NDI 1995:1). The same kind of statements 
could be heard at a workshop of UNICE in March 1995 (EE 1995:1).
Industry representatives, but also some governments and politicians, tend to 
deny or conveniently forget the hard fact that every survey on industry’s motives 
for doing something about environmental problems comes to the same 
conclusions: for the vast majority of industries, regardless of their country of 
origin, a corporate environmental policy depends on the presence of legislation. 
Moreover, in companies which aim to go beyond compliance with legal require­
ments, the main driving force is gaining advantages by anticipating legislation.
While the environment now occupies a permanent position on the managerial 
agendas of most bigger industries, business has responded to the challenge in its 
own, well-known way: reducing it to a management problem of limited 
proportions and seeking solutions in rational and pro-active management. Hence 
the relative popularity of environmental management systems and the scarcity of 
business initiatives that explore more far reaching solutions that translate the 
concept of sustainability into concrete actions.
Is industry really going green or is it all 'greenwash', as Greenpeace stated in a 
1992-report (Greenpeace 1992)? The credibility of industry's environmental 
performance is one of the central issues in this debate between industry and 
environmentalists. Differences between individual companies on this point have 
grown widely, however, which makes generalisations more difficult. There are 
enormous divergences in attitude towards environmental issues between branches 
of industry, between companies and even within companies. There are also 
growing market niches for environmentally sound products. This is essential to 
understanding the discussion on new instruments in environmental and industrial 
policy.
The accountability of industry's environmental performance is still extremely 
low. Only a very small part of industry (less than one percent) is publishing 
annual environmental reports, of which only a few are externally verified. 
Accountability is only partial; for example, products and raw material input are 
usually excluded (UNEP 1994). Implementation of public release and transfer 
registers by governments (PRTR's), documenting emissions of all industrial 
companies, are strongly resisted by industry organisations and individual compa­
nies. At the EU level, the Pollution Emission Register initiative of the 
Commission, for instance, is so strongly opposed by CEFIC that all work on the 
PER seems to have stopped. This represents a remarkable lobbying result of the 
chemical industry, because transparency of performance is a pre-requisite for 




























































































Inventory is under pressure from certain parts of industry and several politicians, 
in order to reduce the extent of its right-to-know impact.3
Still, there is value in the concept of shared responsibility between govern­
ments and industry, because it seems unlikely that sustainability can be reached 
solely through command-and-control. The enormous reservoir of industry's 
creativity must be used and refocussed on issues of sustainability.4 However, to 
overcome a number of major dilemmas, it is indispensable that governments dare 
to make difficult decisions, sometimes against established interests.
The vehicle for realising sustainable development must be a credible 
environmental policy. Attention in the discussion on new instruments in EU 
environmental policy is too much distracted by claims that command and control 
and self-regulation are mutually exclusive; that environmental policy must be 
comprised entirely from one rather than the other (as noted in chapter 1, similar 
polarisation plagues the FME debate) . This is in fact a false dichotomy. A 
credible environmental policy means that transparency, effectiveness, equity and 
efficiency are criteria of the highest order. In practice, this will have to lead to an 
intelligent mix of different instruments: regulatory, economic (like subsidies and 
ecotaxes), social (like negotiated agreements), fiscal (like special tax schemes for 
green stocks) and information instruments (like education and technology 
development and transfer programmes), giving frontrunner companies some 
advantages and treating laggards with a straight command and control approach.
Policy Context: The Need for Improved Environmental Performance from 
Industry
The already limited advantages of negotiated agreements will only become 
evident in a credible policy which is designed to put the right responsibilities on 
the right shoulders. Otherwise negotiated agreements become an isolated and 
useless or even dangerous instrument which undermines existing policy 
instruments. This section devotes some attention to this wide-ranging issue.
The sense or nonsense of negotiated environmental agreements should be 
analysed within the context of a number of logical requirements of effective 
environmental policy:
’information can be found regularly in the newspaper of the Working Group on Community 
Right-to-Know in Washington, D.C.
4Many studies have tried to identify the actual policy changes required to achieve sustainable 




























































































1. it enforces transparency and accountability;
2. it ensures that market forces work for you;
3. it provokes creativity;
4. it creates flexibility;
5. it exhibits coherent design.
First, improving the environmental performance of industry demands 
transparency and accountability. There is a great need to draw a company's 
performance out of the shadows of uncontrollable claims or even complete 
silence. The history of the American Toxics Release Inventory has shown that 
dramatic improvements of a company's performance can be achieved when 
companies are given the possibility of competing in the market or in public 
relations on the basis of a credible environmental performance. It provides an 
opportunity for shareholders, banks, insurance companies and business partners 
to obtain answers to their questions regarding the environmental risks of 
companies and their products, thereby improving the credibility of both 
government and industry in society. Therefore, vital instruments are:
• a legal obligation of companies to submit their emission data to a central, 
publicly accessible register, or PRTR (for example the EU Pollution 
Emissions Register if it doesnt languish). In 1996, the OECD developed 
guidelines for PRTR's as a consequence of the decisions at the UN conference 
in Rio in 1992 (OECD 1996);
• a legal obligation to publish the environmental characteristics of chemical 
substances for which a company requests market access;
• a legal obligation for industrial companies to publish annually an adequate 
environmental report which is externally verified (similar, for instance, to the 
reporting requirements of the US Security and Exchange Commission);
• public access to all information pertaining to negotiated environmental 
agreements and their results, including information at the level of 
individual companies, as well as evaluations of the enforcement of 
environmental regulations.
Second, as the market is a powerful force in creating effective regulation with 
regard to the environment, one must look for policy instruments that change the 




























































































that differences between the environmental performance of individual companies 
can play a clear role in the marketplace. Instruments which might be expected to 
be highly effective are:
• the introduction of extended producer responsibility, i.e. the producer of 
products remains responsible for them during their user- and end-of-life 
phases (Greenpeace 1995a);
• the introduction of green taxes (Greenpeace 1995b, Dietz, Vollebergh and 
De Vries 1995);
• a shift from labour taxes to taxing the use of the environment;
• strong legislation on liability for environmental and health damage, 
including access to justice;
• a high quality certification scheme for environmental management 
systems (of which EM AS is a very first step) (see ch. 10);
• an ambitious ecolabel scheme (see ch. 9).
Third, while it is generally believed that environmental regulations usually do not 
stimulate innovation and creativity, this is not an inevitable characteristic of 
regulations, let alone of environmental policy instruments in general. Stimulating 
constructive creativity in industry in order to reach better solutions for 
environmental problems is an invaluable quality of environmental policy. 
Instruments to reach this include:
• challenging, longer term environmental targets with a commitment of 
industry to reach them;
• whenever possible do not prescribe the application of a specific pollution 
abatement method, but set a performance goal and let industry find how 
best to achieve it;
• stimulate co-operation between companies located on a particular site or 
within a limited region by analysing whether waste streams of one 





























































































• look for coalitions with companies who wish to go (much) further than 
'business-as-usual' and find ways of rewarding them if they indeed per­
form better.
Fourth, flexibility is a valuable aspect of a more effective environmental policy. 
In contrast to creativity, which is essential for meeting longer term and 
challenging objectives, flexibility is more focused on the shorter term. For 
example, industry should be allowed to discuss with authorities the setting of 
environmental priorities on the basis of cost-effectiveness and investment reali­
ties, as long as the objectives themselves, fixed by these authorities, will not be 
violated and will be met on time.
Fifth, coherence in the design of the legal framework is essential, though this 
is quite difficult to reach. It focuses on the elimination of bloated and burdensome 
bureaucracy, the coordination of legislative scope, definitions and terminology, as 
well as on sufficient financial resources for manpower and training in order to 
implement and enforce environmental regulations.
If we compare the characteristics of negotiated agreements with these 
requirements, agreements might score well on several points. However, the 
contrary is just as likely to be the case, depending on the way the agreements are 
negotiated, designed, implemented and enforced. The next section will therefore 
focus on the proper rules of the game for negotiated agreements.
The Rules of the Game
In this section we would like to communicate experiences with negotiated agree­
ments, particularly in The Netherlands. Based on many experiences with 
environmental agreements, especially with the many mistakes made in the first 
generation of agreements in the late 1980s, a number of ‘rules of the game’ are 
derived (for the Dutch literature on these rules, see Winsemius 1993, Bogie 1993, 
Commissie voor de Toetsing van Wetgevingsvraagstukken 1992). We want to 
add that in The Netherlands guidelines for agreements in general (not just 
environmental ones) have been formalised and published by the government (a 
preliminary version was published in English by the Ministry of Housing, 





























































































Our 'rules of the game' entail:
1. Ambitions criteria
• the environmental targets of the agreement must be set high enough so that 
companies perform better than would be the case with 'business as usual' or 
mere compliance with existing legislation. In general, this means that the 
targets are not negotiable by industry, but rather are based on a long-term 
environmental policy devised by the government;
• wherever possible, the objective must be to award companies that do more than 
is minimally required (compliance, 'business as usual'), for example through 
flexibility in reaching specified targets or certain financial benefits, and to 
prevent free-riders by withholding from them these rewards and confronting 
them with a straightforward command-and-control approach. This objective 
becomes difficult in a situation without regulation or other standards'.
2. Choice criteria
• the agreement must not violate existing legislation;
• the characteristics of the parties involved are crucial for a successful agree­
ment. These characteristics pertain to knowledge, professionalism, representa­
tiveness, negotiating position, level of organisation, credibility and mutual 
respect;
• parties must show a strong commitment to the environmental objectives of the 
agreement and be prepared to effectively solve troubles arising in the imple­
mentation process;
• in general, there must be a limited number of parties (companies, authorities) 
involved;
• the choice of the instrument must be considered according to the situation and 
in the context of the implementation of other and additional policy instruments. 
A regulatory framework for the issues agreed upon, which defines minimum 
performance standards for industry, is always necessary and should therefore 
be in place or at least be prepared at an early stage for eventual implementa­
tion.
3. Design criterion
• the agreement must offer a clear solution (quantified targets) for a well- 





























































































• the agreement must make clear who the parties to the agreement are and what 
their obligations are;
• the agreement must offer safeguards for third parties, including publication of 
the text, public access to periodic monitoring results and to the contribution of 
individual companies, and verification of the results;
• the agreement must tackle the free-rider issue through the possibility of sanc­
tions and be binding on all parties;
• the agreement must offer some kind of reward for companies going further 
than compliance and/or 'business as usual';
• procedures for consultation of the parties and for changing or terminating the 
agreement must be defined;
• the results must be evaluated and made public, and the procedure for non- 
compliance with the targets of the agreement must be foreseen.
We will illustrate the meaning and relevance of these rules by elaborating on a
range of Dutch examples of integral and single issue agreements respectively.
Experiences with 'integral' agreements
Experiences with integral agreements, i.e. agreements which establish medium to 
long-term targets and cover a whole set of environmental parameters of a 
particular branch of trade, are very limited within the EU (as well as outside). The 
Netherlands stands out clearly with their target group policy on industry, which 
has received widespread attention throughout the industrialised world. This, 
however, is not the only type of negotiated agreement in The Netherlands. Of the 
approximately 80 agreements with industry, only 10 are integral agreements (Oko 
Institut et al. 1996). Together, these agreements address less than 300 companies, 
emitting the major part of the industrial pollution in The Netherlands.
Integral negotiated agreements are both a communicative and a management 
instrument, in contrast to most 'single-issue' negotiated agreements. The Dutch 
integral agreements build on existing command and control type instruments, but 
strive to incorporate commitment of industry to long-term objectives, a real 
integrated approach, flexibility for industry and transparency for the parties and 




























































































In most cases it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of these integral 
agreements, but in some cases there are enough results available to draw 
meaningful preliminary conclusions. Our experience is that negotiated 
agreements do not work or have at least a high risk of failure, unless they meet 
the rules described above (see also Biekart 1995).
Chemicals
The best example of (relative) success has been the negotiated agreement with the 
chemical industry. In April 1993, the chemical industry, not only the trade 
organisation but also most of the 130 individual companies, signed an agreement 
with the ministries of environment, economic affairs and water management, the 
twelve provinces and the organisation of municipalities. It contains quantitative 
targets for the main emissions (air, water, soil, waste, energy) for 1995 and 2000, 
with indicative targets for 2010. For most emissions, reductions between 50% and 
99% relative to the year 1985 are required. These targets were reasonably 
ambitious and non-negotiable. They do not bear the character of standards. The 
reduction objectives were derived directly from the National Environmental 
Policy Plan, which was adopted by Parliament in 1989. For its part, the NEPP 
was based on a quantitative assessment of the environmental situation in The 
Netherlands, entitled Concern for Tomorrow (RIVM 1988). The agreement is a 
declaration of intent which creates obligations, but no liabilities.
Under the agreement companies are obliged to write a company environ­
mental plan (CEP) in which they indicate how they want to implement the 
objectives of the agreement in terms of concrete measures. This is done in steps; a 
CEP covers a four-year period and must contain an outlook for the next four year- 
period. Every four years the CEP is completely revised and every year a report is 
compiled on the actual progress made. Thus, in the time-span of the agreement, 
four or five CEP's will be written by each participating company. An essential 
article in the agreement is that companies should implement the agreement by 
applying best available technologies (BATNEEC), which is required anyway in 
the Dutch permit procedures, and that they must justify the choices made in their 
CEP. If the CEP is considered acceptable by the permit-giving authority, it is 
taken as the basis for the legally required periodic revision of permits or for a new 
permit.
Herein lies one of the chances for awarding participating companies more 
flexibility. Industry itself is not so much opposed to ambitious objectives, as long 
as they have enough time to anticipate them. Industry highly favours certainty and 
stability in what is being asked from them. Through the CEP, a company gets the 
chance to anticipate long-term objectives, and enjoys the liberty to propose 




























































































cost-effectiveness, depreciations of existing installations, etc. Also, negotiations 
take place with regard to an integral package of measures, while formerly the 
company had to talk to different permit-giving authorities for the different 
environmental aspects of its production site. This also means that under the 
agreement it can be considered acceptable that a company does not yet implement 
BATNEEC for water if it is logical to give high priority to BATNEEC for air 
emissions (to put it simply).
The CEP's are available to the public on request, just like the yearly 
evaluation reports. This is particularly important, because in this way the 
environmental performance and plans of a company can be monitored by third 
parties, which is a big stimulus in the dynamics of the agreement. The progress of 
the sector as a whole is monitored by adding up the results of the individual 
CEP's and comparing these with the objectives of the agreement. The results are 
evaluated by a formal body, the Overleggroep Chemische Industrie. This body is 
responsible for the correct implementation of the agreement and consists of 
representatives of the chemical industry and several public authorities. 
Bottlenecks in the evaluation study are traced down to the individual company, 
where the possibilities of specific action are discussed and (if agreement is found) 
measures are taken. Usually this will mean applying measures beyond 
BATNEEC. If no agreement can be found, there is always the permit procedure to 
fall back upon (with its public inquiry and appeal procedure) where the authority 
can ask of the company what it thinks is necessary. Of course, the company (like 
third parties) can also object to these permit prescriptions and can go to court. 
The permit procedure with its legal requirements thus forms the safety-net.
In mid 1996, the results of the first round of CEP's of the chemical industry 
were compiled and bottlenecks have been identified. It is clear that most of the 
2000 targets will probably be reached, but some 20 percent of the targets will not, 
at least not on the basis of the first generation of CEP's. Most of these bottlenecks 
have an economic background (too expensive to solve in the view of companies), 
and not a technical one. A substantial number of companies contribute to three of 
these bottlenecks: NO„ vinylchloride and CO. The other problems lie generally 
with only one or a few companies.
Several evaluations of the first generation of CEP's have made clear that 
industry does not actually do more than was already foreseen in permits or other 
arrangements with authorities (Inspectie Milieuhygiene 1995, Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat 1995, Inter Provinciaal Overleg 1996). In fact, reduction of 
emissions to water have probably decreased less quickly than would have been 
the case without the agreement. Emissions to air on the other hand have probably 
been reduced more than in a scenario without the agreement. A possible reason 




























































































site-made clear that the reduction of emissions to air were relatively more urgent 
than reduction of emissions to water. This in turn has a range of causes which 
cannot be discussed here. The level of strategic environmental thinking in the 
chemical industry still proves to be generally low, which is a subject of concern 
and action by the trade organisation VNCI and others. Still, the CEP instrument 
has proved to be a big stimulus for companies to think integrally about the 
environment. Furthermore, through the writing of a CEP, many companies have 
been confronted with the fact that they still cannot quickly generate accurate 
environmental data. This shows the urgency of the introduction of good environ­
mental management systems. The question how far companies have really been 
given more flexibility in case of good behaviour or have been confronted with 
strong permit requirements in case of bad behaviour is still a subject of evaluation 
by the Environmental Inspectorate.
Oil and Gas
Apart from this case in the chemical industry, some integral negotiated 
agreements specify inappropriate objectives and suffer from poor design. The 
June 1995 agreement with the oil and gas exploration and production sector, for 
example, has a more or less similar design to the agreement with the chemical 
industry, but with some important differences which undermine its effectiveness.
The most important difference is that the offshore oil and gas industry (14 
companies) is not subject to the Environmental Management Law (Wet 
milieubeheer), under which all other business activities fall. Therefore, offshore 
oil and gas installations need no environmental permit. There is only one regulati­
on applicable (included in a non-environmental law), which is concerned with 
banning the discharge of oil-based drilling muds. Exploration and production of 
oil and gas fall under the jurisdiction of the ministry of economic affairs. 
Therefore, this ministry, with its ideology of non-interference in the market, i.e. 
no regulation, was the responsible ministry for the agreement. However, the 
ministries of water management and environment participated in the negotiation 
process and have succeeded to a certain extend in improving the design of the 
agreement. Luckily, the objectives of the agreement were derived directly from 
the National Environmental Policy Plan and were not themselves negotiated. 
These objectives are similar to those contained in the chemical industry 
agreement, i.e. reduction percentages for all emissions, relative to 1985. Howe­
ver, and this is another weakness, the trade organisation NOGEPA attached 
critical remarks to many of these environmental objectives. Therefore it is 
questionable if industry has a similar perception of the environmental problems as 




























































































In this particular case, the choice for an agreement meant in practice that the 
negotiated path was officially preferred instead of regulation, though no argu­
ments have been substantiated why an agreement was considered more effective. 
This is remarkable, because originally the ministry of water management intended 
to introduce legislation for this category of industry, though it faced heavy 
opposition from the ministry of economic affairs. Difficult consultations between 
the three ministries and the sector on necessary environmental measures for the 
offshore industry had been going on since 1989. In 1992, an Environmental 
Action Plan was formulated, in which a number of important legislative activities 
were foreseen. But then the idea arose to switch to the negotiated agreement 
approach and the parties abandoned the legislative proposals, causing a delay in 
the implementation of concrete measures of at least three years, but in practice 
probably in the order of 8 to 10 years. As third parties had no possibilities for 
inquiry and appeal because of the lack of a system of environmental permits for 
offshore platforms, a special procedure has been designed through the efforts of 
the environment ministry so that third parties may comment on draft CEP's. An 
appeal procedure is not foreseen, however. Monitoring of the agreement is carried 
out by the sector itself, instead of by an independent agency, as in the chemical 
industry (the FOI).
The results based on the first generation of draft-CEP's in the offshore oil and 
gas sector in mid-1996 show rather disappointing results. While large reductions 
of S 02 and CH4 emissions have been achieved (meeting the objectives of the 
agreement), substantial bottlenecks remain to be tackled (in particular NO,), and 
water discharges have hardly been dealt with. The successes are mainly achieved 
through simple technical measures and by the closure of platforms. In spite of the 
agreement, water discharges are not considered a problem by industry, while NO, 
emissions have actually risen due to the need to increase pressure in end-of-life 
oil and gas reservoirs. If the originally intended regulations had been introduced, 
the performance of industry would have been much better, because then for the 
first time in history this sector would have been confronted with the same 
environmental requirements as in any other branches of trade.
Other integral agreements
Various flaws have plagued other integral negotiated agreements concluded in 
The Netherlands as well, though this does not mean necessarily that they do not 
work. That also depends on the particulars of the situation:
• An agreement with the base metal industry (1992) meets all of the ‘rules of the 
game’ criteria but has been hampered in practice because of the unwilling 
attitude of most participating companies (i.e. an element of the choice criteria). 




























































































control in order to reach the necessary environmental improvement. A further 
problem is the relatively high costs of substantially reducing emissions, due to 
the capital-intensive character of this industry. Finally, there have been serious 
problems with transparency because many companies did not want to give their 
CEP to third parties. For details, see Stichting Natuur en Milieu (1994);
• Agreements with the printing industry (1993) and the metal- and electronic 
industry (1995) both do not meet the element of the choice criteria that there 
must be a limited number of parties involved. Both sectors contain too many 
companies, the metal sector even comprising more than 10.000 companies. 
Though the organisation of the implementation of these agreements differs 
from those with the chemical and base metal industry (with packages of 
measures for particular groups of companies), the results are very difficult to 
monitor and problems are very difficult to tackle. Finally, the rewards for 
companies are much less evident then in other agreements. The agreement with 
the printing industry was scheduled for evaluation in 1997;
• Although the agreement on petrol filling stations (1991) does not meet an 
element of the choice criterion (number of companies addressed), it works 
rather well. Partly because the agreement has been supported by regulation (on 
request of the companies), but also because the sector itself decided to set up a 
sectoral fund (SUBAT) for soil sanitation; the most pressing environmental 
problem of the sector (besides VOC-emissions). This fund is generated from a 
small rise in the price of petrol. Filling stations which decided to close down 
before a certain deadline (often the ones owned by a private person who could 
not afford soil sanitation) could apply to the fund, which then takes the 
responsibility for paying the soil sanitation. Very important in this case has 
been the role of the major oil companies, which own a large portion of the 
petrol filling stations and whose role will increase through this restructuring of 
the sector. More information is found in Stichting Natuur en Milieu (1993).
Experiences with 'single issue' agreements
Most of the many negotiated agreements in the member states of the European 
Union are concerned with single environmental issues (for a recent overview of 
existing European agreements see Oko Institut et al. 1996). One can think of 
particular waste streams like batteries, old tyres, wrecked cars, packaging, 
emissions of volatile organic compounds, CFC's, energy efficiency (or CO2 
emissions), soil sanitation, tropical timber, and so on. The important thing to 
realise with this type of agreement is that, in contrast with the integral agreements 
described above, they are usually not meant to be a communicative or manage­




























































































environmental performance. They are usually meant as an instrument for reaching 
a specific environmental goal where regulation is very complicated or even hardly 
possible, or (usually in the bad cases) as an alternative to regulation. A number of 
modem Dutch cases illustrate the limitations of poorly considered single issue 
agreements as well as the potential environmental gains from agreements which 
adhere to the essential rules of the game.
Energy Efficiency
A particularly striking example is the large group of single issue agreements on 
energy efficiency which have been concluded since 1992. The responsible 
ministry is economic affairs, which has no high environmental ambitions and 
prefers a no-regrets policy in this area. This is the main reason for their choice of 
the instrument in the first place. There are more than 30 of these agreements, but 
some 18 for industrial sectors. The energy efficiency agreements violate several 
elements of the aforementioned rules. Although the choice of the instrument 
might be justified in this particular case, the problems lie in the ambitions and the 
design criteria.
The ambitions of the agreements are low, despite enormous scope for energy 
savings in industry. The present objectives barely exceed the average increase in 
energy efficiency which industry already achieves by itself (1.0 to 1.2 
percent/year vs. 1.6 to 1.8 percent/year required by the agreements). As a rule, 
measures considered under the agreements must have a maximum pay back time 
of three to five years, which actually means normal profitable business practice 
and nothing more. This is also what is meant by 'no-regrets' policy. Studies show 
that the economic potential (cost-neutral options) and technical potential (all 
known options, without reference to costs) are each much higher (World Wide 
Fund for Nature 1996): efficiency gains of between 24 and 29% for economic 
potential and 37% for technical potential are possible between 1990 and 2000. 
These percentages increase substantially if the time horizon is extended.
Moreover, efficiency targets do not limit the C 02 emissions in an absolute 
sense. Although the official intention of the government is to reduce C 02 emissi­
ons 3 percent by 2000 from 1989 levels, due to the central position of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in energy policy, energy efficiency objectives were 
chosen instead of C 0 2 reduction targets. Between 1992 and 1996 the government 
lowered the national industry targets for 2000 (relative to 1989) from 20% to 16% 
efficiency increase, because of lower economic growth. However, C 0 2 emissions 
for 2000 are predicted to rise by 7%, instead of dropping by 3%, due precisely to 




























































































In an evaluation done by Stichting Natuur en Milieu (1996), the non­
committal form of the energy efficiency agreements is an aspect that is incre­
asingly problematic for sectors of industry lagging behind in schedule. For exam­
ple, the paper and board industry, the rubber industry and many branches within 
the food industry are considerably behind schedule (Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken 1996). Only when considerable efforts are made will these sectors be able 
to reach their objectives for 2000 . This is not a problem of technical possibilities, 
as has been mentioned, but mainly a lack of attention for the problem within the 
companies. There is no real stick behind the door in order to deal with free-riders. 
Although since 1992 authorities may prescribe energy demands in environmental 
permits, companies participating in one of the energy agreements are exempted 
from this permit obligation, provided that their efforts are in line with the 
objectives of the agreement. This is also the reward for companies participating in 
the agreements.
Also, permit-giving authorities first have to check whether a company adequa­
tely fulfils its agreement obligations. However, the lack of transparency goes very 
far, because not even the authority gets access to the actual data of the company; 
it has to rely on the opinion of an intermediary organisation, NOVEM, which 
carries out all monitoring of the energy agreements. If NOVEM endorses the 
performance of the company, the authority cannot prescribe energy measures in 
the permit. NOVEM, for its part, relies for data on the companies themselves; in 
some cases even on the trade organisation which collects the data, and there is no 
verification. There are known cases where a company performed badly, but 
received the consent of NOVEM (for example Triton Paper company). In those 
sectors which fall behind in schedule, one would expect that companies would 
have measures prescribed in their permit, but there are no indications that this 
really happens. It is possible that this will only occur if the sector does not 
improve its performance in the period 1995-2000.
The lack of transparency naturally extends also to the public. Though compa­
nies have to produce a company energy plan under the articles of the agreement, 
even an abstract of this plan only becomes public if there is a new environmental 
permit application. Several NGO's tried to get access to the information in the 
hands of NOVEM through the Court by asking to apply the law on Open 
Government Practices. In December 1994, the Court held that formally the 
ministry of economic affairs could not supply the data, because NOVEM held 
these. NOVEM didn't want to provide them because they were not a partner in the 
agreements. The Court went on to say that this construction was culpable and 
contrary to the meaning of the law on Open Government Practices. But in 
practice nothing could be done and nothing has changed since then. The lack of 





























































































In the EU several other weak negotiated or voluntary schemes for industrial 
energy efficiency have been signed. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is 
a highly ineffective ‘Making a Corporate Commitment Campaign’, only asking 
industry to sign a declaration which contains seven principles. These seven 
principles do not contain quantitative objectives and are not obligatory for the 
participating companies to implement. In surveys of the Department of the 
Environment there are strong indications of the ineffectiveness of the scheme. 
Still, the UK government considers the declaration one of its major policy 
elements in reaching C 0 2 reduction targets (Jenkins 1995). Similarly, German 
industry designed a number of Selbstverpflichtungen in 1996 for the reduction of 
C 02 . According to experts within the Dutch chemical industry, the way the 
monitoring of these Selbstverpflichtungen is done gives a meaningless picture of 
the actual increase in energy efficiency.
Packaging
Another example of a 'single issue' agreement is the packaging agreement which 
was signed in 1991 between the ministry of the environment and the Stichting 
Verpakking en Milieu, representing approximately 150 companies. The targets of 
the agreement, specified for five types of packaging waste (glass, ferrous metals, 
non-ferrous metals, paper and plastics) were not very ambitious: in particular, the 
general target of only a 10% reduction in packaging waste over ten years time 
was rather low. The agreement also established an overall minimum recycling 
target of 60% in ten years (50 to 80% depending on material type), and included 
interim (halfway) objectives for 1995. Still, the agreement led to action in an area 
where effective regulation of re-use and recycling was not possible, because 
general legislation for a very diverse range of packaging products is very difficult 
to formulate and control. The targets of the agreement have been negotiated by 
industry to a certain extend: the reduction percentage is now related to what is 
reachable with current industrial improvement trends, rather than a more 
ambitious reduction goal.
Initially, monitoring of industry's performance was chaotic and data were very 
difficult to obtain by third parties. Several years after the signing of the 
agreement, this situation has significantly improved, not least through the 
influence of environmental organisations and the strong interest of the press. 
Now, both industry and an independent research organisation (RIVM) monitor 
the yearly progress and publish the results. Information about individual company 
performance, however, is still lacking.
The weakest point of the agreement is the unpunished free-rider behaviour of 
a group of companies, which, particularly for plastic waste, is the main reason 




























































































(although other targets have, particularly those for waste streams where effective 
collection systems have been in place for many years, i.e. paper and glass) 
(Commissie Verpakkingen 1995). No provisions have been made in the 
agreement to tackle this problem.
The EU directive on packaging waste, which came into force in 1994, might 
solve this problem to a certain extent. This directive contains very unambitious 
targets, at least much less ambitious than the Dutch packaging agreement (the EU 
law requires at least 15% recycling for every stream of packaging waste).5 The 
point is that the directive legally obliges a government to address producers of 
packaging material. In October 1996, the EU packaging directive was implemen­
ted in Dutch law and consequently the existing packaging agreement was 
deposed. Negotiations were still going on with industry with the goal of 
continuing the agreement in another form. The problematic point here is that the 
Dutch government is hampered in its negotiating position because it can no 
longer threaten to adopt recycling measures which go much further than the EC 
directive.6 The intention is now to exempt companies from the law if they join a 
new packaging agreement. This gives them some flexibility as they are not bound 
to strict rules, but as a consequence they have to perform better than required 
under EC law. If they do not perform better, the law is there to guarantee a 
minimum performance and measures for individual companies can be enforced.
Similar or (more often) worse experiences with packaging agreements have 
been noted in several EU member states, with the UK as a documented disaster. 
The extremely sluggish reaction of British industry to repeated government calls 
to present a packaging plan meeting five key criteria indicated the problems to 
come. At a certain stage industry itself even asked the government to come up 
with regulations, in order to overcome their internal problems (Eden 1997). In the 
period 1990 to 1995, not even a concrete plan of action was decided upon, by 
government or by industry (Jenkins 1995, Eden 1997).
5 For a discussion of the directive’s development, and its relatively weak requirements 
compared to various pre-existing national recycling schemes, see Golub (1997).
6 In this case the relative laxness of EU standards constrains the use of voluntary agreements; 
although the directive allows member states to establish more stringent recycling targets, a 
number of conditions must be satisfied (e.g. self-sufficiency, proximity), and there is a risk of 
violating EU rules on free trade. In other cases, however, it is the possibility of stringent EU 
rules which acts as a constraint by injecting considerable uncertainty during the negotiating 




























































































Flaws have plagued many 'single issue' agreements in other areas of Dutch 
environmental policy:
• An agreement on plastic waste reduction in industry (1993) does not comply 
with elements of our ambition, choice and design criteria: after three years of 
negotiating this agreement said only that in 1995, industry should have finished 
research into the possibilities of prevention and re-use of plastic waste within 
companies. Objectives are lacking, despite the fact that in 1988 the ministry of 
environment had already formulated a concrete target. After several years of 
implementation, this agreement is still hardly known in industry.
• An agreement on the reduction of pesticide use is far behind schedule because 
of severe failures with regard to elements of our choice and design criteria. The 
lack of adequate regulation (in particular the admittance policy of existing and 
new pesticides) and/or other substantial incentives like taxing of pesticides are 
the main cause for the failure of this agreement. Many more details are 
provided in a joint report of a large group of national and regional NGO's 
(Muilerman and Steekelenburg 1996).
• An agreement between a national water authority and Hydro Agri (a producer 
of artificial fertilisers) (1987) did not meet elements of our choice and design 
criteria. As a consequence, in the permitting procedure existing legal 
requirements were violated. Therefore the agreement was nullified in a court 
procedure prompted by two NGO's (see Biekart (1995) for details).
• A really effective agreement was signed on the reduction of acidifying 
emissions from electricity plants (1990). This agreement meets our criteria and 
it works. The main point is that the electricity companies themselves may 
decide whether a site is subjected to further emission control, as long as the 
targets for the sector as a whole are met. This is purely a matter of cost- 
effectiveness. The agreement is supported by legislation on emission standards 
for electric power plants.
Reports for the EC on negotiated agreements (Oko Institut et al 1996) and other 
information sources illustrate the meagre results of single issue agreements in 
several member states, as well as in other countries. Agreements that work are 
almost inevitably supported on one or more points by legislation. In the other 
cases, agreements usually do not work well, or only because specific pressures 
have been effective:




























































































• A good example of the necessity of regulatory support is Denmark with its 
agreement on the recycling of car batteries. Here, after an agreement had been 
signed, an extensive set of rules and regulations developed in the course of the 
time in order to cope with a range of possibilities for free-riders to circumvent 
the agreement. But with these in place the agreement seems to work (Pedersen 
and Elmvang 1996).
• An example of effective external pressures is the agreement in Germany on the 
reduction of the use of CFC's in refrigerators, earlier than legally required. 
Through the introduction of the CFC-free refrigerator ('Greenfreeze') by a joint 
initiative of Greenpeace and DKK Scharfenstein, supported by the legislation 
of environment minister Topfer, all leading producers such as Bosch-Siemens 
and Liebherr had CFC refrigerators on the market within six months of 
claiming that commercialisation of such a technology was not possible.
Our examples illustrate that negotiated agreements, integral or single issue, must 
obey the rules of the game, or run the serious risk of failure. Only when the 
authorities (or government) involved plays their negotiating role adequately may 
negotiated agreements become a useful instrument, creating commitment and 
cooperation between industry and government parties.
The present experiences with negotiated agreements, integral or single issue, 
can hardly prove that industry performs better with than without them. Often the 
contrary seems to be true. In the shorter term, the benefit is in the process, not in 
the performance: it calls for industry to take its responsibilities and it might 
integrate environmental thinking in business practices. In the longer term, that 
might change and real results might be achieved, but only if the process works 
well enough. As some of the previous examples illustrate, agreements designed 
according to the rules of the game (in particular the integrated ones), might 
provide the fertile ground for more strategic environmental thinking in industry, 
on the condition that government also takes the necessary actions.
Pros and Cons: Frequently Heard Arguments
This section devotes attention to a number of important issues with regard to 
negotiated agreements which could not be dealt with in earlier sections. Many of 
these issues are mentioned in the international discussion on negotiated 
agreements.
In the view of some people, command-and-control type regulation has proven 
to be ineffective, and therefore new instruments like negotiated agreements are 




























































































truth in this view, it is far too simplistic. While a great deal of environmental 
legislation is not effective, this has nothing to do with the instrument itself, but 
finds its root causes in a sometimes too detailed and complicated design of 
legislation, and more especially in the lack of money and political attention 
devoted to implementation and enforcement.
Implementation and enforcement of negotiated agreements require capable, 
flexible and creative people, who can negotiate and distinguish between features 
and details. It requires permanent training of people. These are high standards, 
but the point is that negotiated agreements do not require less. On the contrary. 
We have seen in The Netherlands that the introduction of negotiated agreements 
requires a change in the culture of permit-giving authorities and enforcement 
personnel that will go on for many years to come. Similarly, the same switch must 
be made by companies, which could formerly wait to see what was being asked of 
them, and react. Now they have to become pro-active and make their own plans; a 
real shock for many of them. Very useful indeed, but it is not easier than a 
command-and-control approach.
In some EU member states (like the United Kingdom) and in Brussels itself, 
an important argument in favour of negotiated agreements is that they entail 
lower costs', lower costs for regulation and lower costs for industry. This can only 
be an argument of a secondary nature. To begin with, one must look at 
environmental effectiveness, otherwise one misses the point. This view is 
supported by the simple fact that the environmental effectiveness of agreements 
usually is monitored, but their economic efficiency is not. However, if one looks 
at the successful agreements in The Netherlands, one may conclude that after an 
initial investment in people and training to carry out negotiated agreements, cost 
benefits may be found in the procedure of giving permits, in particular for com­
panies. At least two chemical companies have tried to estimate cost benefits for 
themselves (Hoechst in Vlissingen and DSM in Geleen). They found results in 
the order of 10% savings in time (= costs) spent. The reason for these savings lies 
in dealing with all the environmental problems of a site in an integral manner. 
The cost savings argument is related to efficiency and naturally does not hold for 
the level of the environmental investments of a company.
For permit-giving authorities, no quantitative data are known on the efficiency 
of agreements in terms of manpower. As observed previously, agreements seem 
to increase the need for qualified personnel. An advantage of the agreements 
might be that it becomes much clearer which companies can bear environmental 
responsibilities, while others show that they need a straightforward approach and 
strong enforcement. At least one province in The Netherlands uses a rating 
system for the quality of the environmental practices of companies, which has 




























































































With regard to the undemocratic nature of negotiated agreements, the 
argument holds in principle, but the problem can be solved by following the rules 
of the game'. Agreements which are not designed according to these rules are 
very often undemocratic indeed. Generally, the reason for not following these 
rules is the wish of the parties involved to make it impossible for any third party 
to track the results of the agreement, whether an environmental NGO, a citizen or 
Parliament.
In our experience, negotiated agreements may become an obstacle to ongoing 
environmental policy and the creation o f new instruments. We have already 
mentioned the agreement with the oil and gas industry which blocked the 
introduction of necessary legislation. The way the ecotax on energy is being 
treated is also very illuminating: industry as a whole is strongly opposed to this 
idea, for obvious reasons. One of their arguments is that they have made a deal 
for the improvement of energy efficiency. In their opinion, an energy tax thwarts 
their voluntary efforts, instead of supporting them. Trade organisations have 
therefore introduced a clause in the energy agreements that the introduction in 
The Netherlands of an ecotax on energy can lead to the termination of the 
agreement. In general, Dutch employers organisations argue continuously that 
government should renounce the introduction of new environmental policies, 
legislation and instruments, because agreements containing environmental 
objectives have already been signed, thus making any new instrument superfluous 
(see ch 4). We have seen this in particular with the discussion around the 
groundwater tax introduced in 1994 (De Graaff 1993).
The question is often put whether agreements block or invite industry to 
innovate. Again, the answer will depend on the particular case being considered. 
In general, agreements which meet the rules of the game will be able to stimulate 
innovation, provided that other instruments are in place in order to overcome 
particular difficulties-particularly financial stimuli, a strong research and 
development sector, within or outside industry, and an effective network of 
intermediate organisations which is working directly with researchers and compa­
nies. If this infrastructure is lacking, companies, especially SME's, will not tend 
to innovate. In the complicated process of pushing companies to innovation, 





























































































This final section evaluates the four propositions put forward in the introduction 
to this paper, and then offers some final remarks regarding the use of negotiated 
agreements in the European Union.
With regard to the first proposition: no example is known to us of an agree­
ment that represents a major step towards sustainability. The ambitions of the 
agreements we have seen are usually compliance with legislation and/or 
somewhat more ambitious targets in the longer term. That is to be expected, 
because the actual balance of power between government and industry will not 
allow more ambitious objectives than would be reachable through other means 
where all parties are consulted, i.e. legislation. Agreements, therefore, will not 
solve the major dilemmas in environmental policy, though when used in the best 
possible way they do contribute towards sustainability.
With regard to the second proposition: although there are examples of 
agreements initially designed without a regulatory framework, in many of these 
cases this framework is constructed in a later phase (often at the request of 
companies themselves) in order to cope with free-riders. In the cases where this 
has not been done, there have been real problems with free-riders.
With regard to the third proposition: access to information provides a strong 
impetus for companies not to stay behind, but rather to stay even with the pack, or 
even perform better than others for reasons of market opportunities or public 
relations. This is a major reason for some environmental NGO's (like ours) to 
support negotiated agreements in particular cases and it is a unique possibility for 
government t>> organise pressure on companies to perform better or to refrain 
from free-riding.
With regard to the fourth proposition: a lack of credibility damages the value 
of an agreement in the eyes of the public, politics and the press. Especially crucial 
is the credibility of the position the governmental party takes in negotiating, 
designing, implementing and enforcing an agreement. There are no examples 
known to us of non-credible agreements that have had good results. A detailed 
look at what first seemed like examples to the contrary revealed cases where 
credibility had improved over one or two years.
Some final words about the application of negotiated agreements in the 
European Union. It is useful to mention that discussion focuses on three types of 
agreements: those at the Community level, those in member states as a possible 
means to implement certain types of EC directives, and purely national 




























































































no value in improving the effectiveness of environmental policy in Europe, unless 
the policy context in Europe is much improved.
Why such a pessimistic view? First, the possibilities of negotiating 
agreements which follow the 'rules of the game' with regard to ambition, choice 
and design are rather few indeed. Frequently agreements will have no additional 
value, as they demonstrably should have. Secondly, the implementation and 
enforcement of many agreements will probably lead to a number of new 
problems, like distinguishing between good and bad performing companies and 
defining adequate enforcement. Also, if agreements meet our 'rules of the game', a 
major shift in attitude and qualifications of both civil servants and industry 
personnel becomes necessary in order to reach good results. Thirdly, agreements 
will only work in optimal form if used in addition to other new instruments which 
fit into the philosophy of putting greater responsibilities on the shoulders of 
industry. Some possibilities were suggested above, but there is no reason to trust 
that such instruments will become available in the near future.
Still, it might be worthwhile to experiment a bit with negotiated agreements, 
both at the Community and member state level. The main problem is not a lack of 
belief in the potential value of negotiated agreements which meet the rules of the 
game. Rather, one wonders how governments will apply these rules and whether 
they will take a firm position when problems arise. In this sense, negotiated 
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